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Short Communication |
1 Institute of Infectology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
2 Institute of Diagnostic Virology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
3 Institute of Molecular Biology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
Correspondence
Thomas W. Vahlenkamp
thomas.vahlenkamp{at}fli.bund.de
| ABSTRACT |
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The GenBank/EMBL/DDBJ accession numbers for the complete genome sequence of novel influenza virus A/H1N1 described in this study are FN401574 [GenBank] –FN401581.
| MAIN TEXT |
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Sporadic cross-species transfer of swine and avian influenza viruses to humans has been documented repeatedly during the last decades. Despite the development of severe clinical signs and fatal pneumonia in some patients, the infections lacked the critical capacity to spread efficiently from human to human in order to pose a threat for medical care (van Reeth, 2007
; Irvine & Brown, 2009
). Since its identification in April 2009, a novel swine-origin influenza virus A/H1N1 containing a unique combination of gene segments from both North American and Eurasian swine lineages has continued to circulate in humans (Cohen, 2009
; Garten et al., 2009
). Similarity analyses between the novel influenza virus A/H1N1 and its nearest relatives indicated that it may have been circulating undetected for an extended period of time (Smith et al., 2009
). As of 3 July 2009, there have been 89 921 laboratory-confirmed cases in over 100 countries, resulting in more than 380 deaths. A key determinant of the current infections is the transmission rate of the novel influenza virus A/H1N1 in humans. Due to the unprecedented worldwide spread of the virus in humans, the WHO raised the influenza alert to the highest pandemic phase level about 10 weeks after the first detection of the virus outside Mexico.
The objectives of the current studies were to investigate (i) whether experimental intranasal infection of pigs with the novel influenza virus results in clinical signs and leads to virus excretion, (ii) whether infection causes alterations in T- or B-lymphocyte subsets and (iii) whether the infection would be transmitted to naïve contact pigs and chickens. For this purpose, five 10-week-old pigs were infected intranasally with 106 TCID50 influenza virus A/Regensburg/D6/09/H1N1 in the BSL3+ facilities at the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut. The pigs were obtained from a commercial farm and tested negative for pre-existing antibodies against influenza A viruses. The animal experiments were approved by the regional ethical committee. The virus had been isolated from a patient in Germany and propagated on Madin–Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells. The complete genome sequence of the virus used for the experiments revealed high similarity to the novel influenza H1N1 viruses characterized worldwide and has been submitted to GenBank under accession numbers FN401574–FN401581. From day 1 post-infection (p.i.), three naïve pigs and five naïve chickens were housed together with the infected animals in direct contact without any cages in the same room. From all pigs, oropharyngeal swabs were taken daily and EDTA–blood samples were obtained on days 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 14 and 21 p.i. From the chickens, cloacal and oropharyngeal swabs were sampled daily and all animals were assessed for disease signs by following a clinical score that included nasal discharge, sneezing, salivation, diarrhoea, fever, emaciation, lid oedema and/or compromised general condition.
Real-time RT-PCR analysis of the swab samples using primers (http://offlu.net) designed to specifically amplify the haemagglutinin gene of the novel influenza virus A/H1N1 could detect virus excretion by day 1 p.i. in two of the five inoculated pigs (Table 1
). Possibly, these two pigs were infected experimentally and subsequently passed the virus to the other pigs. Within 4 days p.i., the swab samples of all infected and contact pigs were positive. Positive RT-PCR results were detected until day 11 p.i., with intermittent days without detectable virus excretion in individual animals (Table 1
). Virus could be reisolated from the swabs in MDCK cells with titres
101.6 TCID50 from day 3 p.i. onwards from the infected animals and from day 5 p.i. onwards from the contact pigs. The last positive virus isolations were obtained on day 11 p.i. All plasma samples remained negative for virus RNA. The experimentally infected pigs developed clinical symptoms from day 3 p.i. None of the animals displayed more than four of the clinical symptoms used as clinical-score criteria at the same time. Clinical signs were mild and generally resembled those described for other swine influenza virus infections (van Reeth et al., 2003
; Zell et al., 2008
). Nasal discharge, sneezing and fever were observed as the main clinical signs between days 4 and 5 p.i. All three naïve contact pigs also developed similar clinical signs with a delay of 2–3 days. Diarrhoea developed between days 3 and 7 p.i. in several of the infected and contact pigs. Examination of the faeces did not reveal any pathogenic bacteria. Most probably, the general compromised condition induced by the infection in these animals supported the development of diarrhoea, which has also been reported in humans infected with recent triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses in the USA (Shinde et al., 2009
).
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Immunological analysis revealed a transient increase of CD4+ and CD8+ T cells with peak levels between days 5 and 6 p.i. (Fig. 1a
), which coincided with the major clinical symptoms in the animals. A similar increase was also observed for B cells in the peripheral blood (data not shown). Further characterization of the CD4+ T cells revealed an early activation of these cells within 24–48 h p.i. (Fig. 1b
), characterized by a significant increase in the expression of CD25 in all infected animals. The three contact animals also showed CD4+ T-cell activation with peak levels 7–8 days p.i.
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The current investigation showed that intranasal infection of pigs with 106 TCID50 of the novel influenza A/H1N1 virus results in virus excretion, clinical signs, activation of the cellular and humoral immune response and transmission of the virus to contact pigs. Typical influenza-like symptoms, such as sneezing and nasal discharge, were observed between days 4 and 5 p.i., which is somewhat delayed compared with previous infection experiments using avian influenza virus-like porcine influenza A/H1N1 viruses currently circulating in the European pig population. In addition, we observed diarrhoea associated with the infection, probably due to the compromised general condition of the pigs during the acute phase of the infection. Despite the fact that diarrhoea was also seen in 30 % of human patients infected in recent years with triple-reassortant swine influenza A (H1) viruses in the USA (Shinde et al., 2009
), no diarrhoea was observed in another study of experimental influenza virus A/H1N1 infection of pigs (Brookes et al., 2009
). It remains to be determined whether diarrhoea is more commonly associated with the novel influenza virus A/H1N1 infection in pigs. In the present study, virus transmission to contact pigs occurred rapidly. Even 3 days after contact, all naïve contact pigs had already started to shed virus. It can be concluded that pigs are susceptible to the novel influenza virus A/H1N1 and it must be assumed that this virus will spread fast and efficiently if introduced into swine farms, possibly establishing endemic infections. Case reports from Canada (http://www.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=single_report&pop=1&reportid=8065) and Argentina (http://www.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=single_report&pop=1&reportid=8238) concerning putative human-to-pig transmissions and also experimental studies of sequential passages of the virus in pigs (Brookes et al., 2009
) support this observation. So far, pigs or other animals have not been demonstrated to be involved in the epidemiology or spread of the novel influenza virus A/H1N1. However, with the increasing numbers of human infections, a spillover of this virus to pigs is becoming more likely. The prevention of human-to-pig transmissions should have high priority in order to avoid involvement of pigs in the epidemiology of this pandemic. As recommended by the OIE, national veterinary services must monitor animal populations effectively for clinical signs of the disease and farmers must follow their veterinary hygiene regulations strictly. Persons suspected of infection should not be allowed to be in contact with pigs. This might be difficult to ensure, especially in backyard holdings. Therefore, appropriate restriction measures for novel influenza virus A/H1N1-infected swine holdings must be agreed on. In addition, vaccination experiments in pigs with currently licensed vaccines against different influenza H1 viruses and with novel influenza virus A/H1N1-specific vaccines should give conclusive information about whether available vaccines are able to induce immunity, protect from clinical signs and/or inhibit virus shedding in pigs. These experiments help to direct infectious disease-control programmes and to improve our understanding of the factors that determine virus pathogenicity and transmissibility in pigs and at the animal–human interface.
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS |
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Received 19 June 2009;
accepted 6 July 2009.
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